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Abstract 
 
Learning new concepts in mathematics and science often involves inhibiting prior beliefs 
or direct perceptual information. Recent neuroimaging work suggests that experts simply 
get better at inhibiting these pre-potent responses rather than replacing prior concepts 
with the newer concepts. A review of both behavioral and neuroimaging evidence with 
children suggests that improving inhibitory control is a key factor in learning new 
scientific and mathematical facts. This finding has implications for how these subjects are 
taught in the classroom and provides corroborating evidence for practices already in 
place.  
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Introduction 
 
What sets us aside from most other species is our ability to develop abstract and causally-
based concepts
1
. These concepts go beyond the information immediately available 
through direct perception and encode an understanding of how elements in the world 
relate to one another in general. Acquiring such abstract concepts underpins school-based 
learning in both mathematics
2
 and science
3, 4
. However, any pupil aiming to acquire 
“new” concepts in science and mathematics needs to overcome the strong pull of existing 
beliefs that have served them so well until then. In science education, this so-called 
“conceptual change” is a formidable obstacle in acquiring knowledge that goes beyond 
popular belief or perception
5
. Similarly, in mathematics, the child needs to go beyond the 
perceptually obvious solutions to understand and apply formal logical solutions to a 
problem
6, 7, 8
.  
 
Recent work in scientific reasoning has suggested that the inhibition of pre-exiting beliefs 
through the activation of the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) is an integral part of the successful evaluation of counterintuitive 
science and mathematics evidence
9, 10
. Thus, in this article, we will review the role that 
concepts play in mathematics and science learning and explore how the brain controls the 
many competing beliefs that we hold in mind at any one time, in a way that allows us to 
take on new ideas. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Learning counterintuitive concepts in mathematics and sciences involve 
increasingly proficient levels of selective inhibition of prior beliefs, and information 
acquired through direct experience and direct perception with age and experience. 
Acronymes:  ACC: anterior cingulate cortex, DLPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
VLPFC: ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. 
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Conceptual change in Science and Mathematics 
Scientific reasoning involves the evaluation of newly gathered evidence and the 
integration of this evidence into one’s existing concepts, theories or models of the 
physical and biological world. Contrary evidence may require the revision of existing 
theories
4, 11, 12
, or the development of an entirely new theory, a process called conceptual 
change
5, 13
. A key element of learning any new concepts is the need to overcome strongly 
held prior beliefs about a domain before new knowledge can be effectively assimilated
14, 
15
. Thus, a major challenge in mathematics and science education is the need for children 
to inhibit pre-existing beliefs or superficial perception in order to engage in acquiring and 
applying new and counterintuitive knowledge
13, 16, 17, 18
. Because of the importance of this 
process in scientific reasoning, many researchers have focused on investigating the naïve 
concepts that children and adults hold about phenomena in various scientific domains. In 
this approach, the goal is often to describe and uncover the mechanisms underlying 
conceptual change as a function of new learning
13. 20, 21
 in, for example, domains such as 
biology
22
, physics
23,
 or evolution
24
.  
 
But what happens as we become experts? Are old concepts overwritten, simply forgotten, 
or do they continue to impact on our thinking. Brain imaging data from adults (typically 
university students) are especially informative here. In a range of tasks it has been shown 
that the interplay between the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which supports conflict 
detection, and multiple regions of the prefrontal cortex supporting attention, inhibitory 
control, working memory and the integration of information, plays a critical role in the 
detection of, and subsequent modification of beliefs and scientific understanding in 
response to conflict between new and prior knowledge
10, 25, 26
. These results suggest that 
an important part of the neural basis of scientific and mathematical learning lies in the 
detection of an anomaly, the inhibition of prior beliefs, and the integration of new 
information and concepts into an updated scientific understanding.  
 
Conceptual knowledge in the brain 
 Brain imaging studies have made a real contribution to our understanding of how 
conceptual knowledge is represented
27
. Two general distinctions are identified: (1) a 
spatial one, whereby “perceptual” processing is associated with more posterior activity, 
over the areas involved in the first steps of visual analysis, while more abstract 
processing is associated with frontal and temporal activity, and (2) a temporal one, 
whereby “perceptual” processing precedes more abstract “conceptual” analysis.   
 
That said, “conceptual” knowledge is located in broad distributed networks28 involving 
many parts of the brain, including: (1) overlapping but partly distinct neural systems for 
processing concrete and abstract concepts, with greater involvement of bilateral 
association areas during concrete word processing, and processing of abstract concepts 
almost exclusively by the left hemisphere
29
, (2) amodal representations that transcend 
particular input modalities
30, 31
, and (3) embodied knowledge which is embedded within 
specific sensori-motor systems
32
. Access to this conceptual knowledge therefore requires 
executive control to leverage those parts of the network that are helpful for the current 
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task and suppress the rest
33, 34, 35
.  
 
Close collaboration between the various knowledge representation networks and a 
cognitive control network is therefore essential for the effective management of existing 
knowledge and the acquisition of new knowledge
36
. Given the complex interrelated 
networks involved in representing conceptual knowledge, a key challenge is to overcome 
interference and inhibit irrelevant information while activating the relevant information. 
Standard information processing approaches to cognition (that abstract away from neural 
processes) represent processes as encapsulated modules (e.g., attention module, working 
memory module, etc.). However, the control of knowledge within neural networks is 
embedded within particular domains of knowledge
33, 37
. This suggests that training 
executive control skills (such as general working memory capacity or inhibitory controls) 
without embedding the training within a specific knowledge domains may not have as 
much impact on the control of knowledge as training within a target domain. Indeed, a 
recent review of the effectiveness of executive functioning training
38
 finds that there is 
little evidence of transfer from training on abstract executive function tasks to academic 
skills, although embedding such activities within the classroom appears to be much more 
effective
39
. 
 
 
Inhibition and the control of conceptual knowledge 
The development of inhibition and the control of interference has long been 
established as a central limiting factor in cognitive development
7, 40
. Children have the 
capacity to make inhibitory responses from infancy, but only gradually get better at using 
this ability
41
. During interference control, children show more diffuse frontal cortex 
activations and a greater recruitment of posterior brain regions; adults by contrast show 
more focal activation in the DLPFC, ACC and inferior frontal gyrus
42, 43
. Similarly, 
neuroimaging evidence with children shows a shift from posterior perceptual processing 
regions to fronto-parietal activations correlating with age and improved performance on 
logic and mathematical problems
44, 45
. This has been interpreted as showing that children 
need to inhibit initial perceptually bound beliefs before being able to successfully apply 
the more abstract and (frontally dependent) reasoning skills required in math and logic. 
Convincing evidence of this shift was presented in a recent meta-analysis of functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data obtained over a decade (1999–2008) on more 
than 800 children and adolescents engaged in numerical tasks. This analysis revealed 
that, unlike adults, children primarily engage the frontal cortex when solving numerical 
tasks. This is consistent with the argument that, with increasing age, there is a shift from 
a reliance on the frontal cortex to reliance on the parietal cortex in mathematical 
reasoning tasks
46
, perhaps due to reduced cognitive load as children gradually acquire 
expertise in mathematics. Though it should be noted that this conclusion relies on the 
reference inference that because frontal regions are more active, greater inhibitory control 
is being exerted. Given the prolonged development of the frontal lobes
43
 it is not possible 
to be entirely sure that functions observed in the developing brain are identical to those 
observed in the mature adult brain, even if the activation patterns are similar. 
 
A second strand of evidence comes from Evans
47
 who posited that there are two 
competing cognitive systems underlying reasoning: the heuristic system, which is 
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evolutionarily old, fast operating, automatic and parallel; and the analytic system, which 
is slow operating, rule based, sequential in nature, and although limited by working 
memory capacity, underlies abstract logical reasoning and hypothetical thinking. A 
defining property of the dual process model of reasoning is that the analytic system is 
able to inhibit and override the heuristic system so that individuals can successfully carry 
out logical tasks
48, 49, 50
. Neuroimaging work on logical and scientific reasoning in adults 
has consistently shown that the inhibition of pre-existing beliefs, misleading perceptual-
biases, and intuitive heuristics is associated with the activation of the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) and the prefrontal cortex, notably the inferior frontal cortex (IFG) and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)
10, 11, 25, 26, 48
. Critically, Houdé et al.
45
 provided 
neuroimaging evidence of a switch, after a brief training in logical reasoning, from the 
heuristic system to the analytic system in adults.  
 
To explore this idea further, several labs
25, 26
 have used an fMRI protocol to obtain 
functional brain images of novices and experts while performing a cognitive task in 
mechanics, a scientific discipline for which misconceptions are known to be frequent and 
persistent. They found that experts, significantly more than novices, activate brain areas 
associated with inhibition; specifically, the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and the 
left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This suggested that the experts' misconceptions in 
mechanics had not been eradicated or transformed during learning but rather that they 
had remained encoded in their brains and were then inhibited to provide a correct answer. 
 
Evidence from the classroom 
Is there any behavioral evidence (relevant to educational practitioners) of the importance 
of inhibitory skills in mathematics and science learning?  Gilmore, et al.
51
 have recently 
explored how inhibition skills are related to overall mathematical achievement as well as 
factual, procedural and conceptual knowledge in 209 participants aged 11 to 12 years, 13 
to14 years, and adults. These authors found that general mathematics achievement was 
more strongly related to inhibition measured in numerical compared with non-numerical 
contexts. Inhibition skills were related to conceptual knowledge in older participants, but 
procedural skills in younger participants. There is also some evidence
52
 of a contribution 
of hippocampal–prefrontal circuits (specifically DLPFC and VLPFC) related to the early 
development of retrieval fluency in arithmetic problem solving. Finally, recent research 
suggests that executive function skills, such as suppressing distracting information and 
unwanted responses (inhibition) play a critical role in the development of mathematics 
proficiency
53, 54
.   
 
The continued development of prefrontal lobes during early adolescence
41, 43
 would imply 
an improvement with age in students’ abilities to inhibit task-irrelevant information and 
coordinate task-relevant information, thereby enhancing their scientific reasoning 
abilities as well as their ability to reject scientific misconceptions and accept scientific 
conceptions, well into adolescence. To test this hypothesis, two hundred and ten 13 to 16 
year old Korean secondary school pupils were tested with 4 tasks known to load on pro-
frontal activity, a test of scientific reasoning ability, and a test of air pressure concepts 
derived from kinetic- molecular theory
55
. The measures of prefrontal lobe activity 
correlated highly with scientific reasoning ability. In turn, prefrontal lobe activity and 
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scientific reasoning ability predicted concept gains and posttest performance. A 
subsequent principal components analysis showed that the study variables had two main 
components, which were interpreted as an inhibiting and a representing component. The 
authors interpreted this as evidence for both the inhibition of task-irrelevant information 
(i.e., the rejection of intuitively derived misconceptions) and the representation of task-
relevant information (i.e., complex hypothetico-deductive arguments and counterintuitive 
scientific conceptions about non-observable entities). 
 
Conclusion 
Imaging and behavioral methods from the developmental cognitive neurosciences have 
enabled us to make great strides in understanding what underlies the complex neural and 
cognitive processes involved in mathematical and scientific concept learning. In turn, this 
work should suggest classroom-based interventions that will improve both science and 
mathematics educational outcomes
53
. A few interventions have begun to implement 
cognitive control training within the classroom environment or within mathematics and 
science teaching
 16, 56, 57, 58
. Results show long-term effects and more generalizable 
benefits when the training is embedded within the curriculum than when it is not
16, 39
.  
 
Finally, it is reassuring to note that the recent emphasis on the importance of inhibitory 
control in learning science and mathematics, which emerges from the cognitive 
neuroscience research, is entirely consistent with older practice-based recommendations 
to encourage students to take a moment of “waiting time” before responding during 
science lessons
59
. By combining these practice-based discoveries with the emerging 
neural-based evidence, we can be increasingly confident of our success in improving 
conceptual learning in mathematics and science education. While there is already a sense 
among teachers that inhibitory control is a foundational skill in mathematics learning
60
, 
feeding back the cognitive neuroscience evidence can only strengthen this conviction and 
further improve practice. 
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